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PERSPECTIVE
GATT Dispute Settlement: An Agenda for
Evaluation and Reform
Jeffrey M. Waincymer*
I. Introduction
In the field of international relations, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GAT) I ranks as a unique phenomenon. 2 Surviv-
ing now for forty years, the GATT has withstood extreme pressures
from changing economic circumstances, diversified membership,
and criticism of its conceptual foundations. It is also unique among
international agreements in its form and manner of operation. 3
Thus, the GAT has created a fertile field of study for political scien-
tists, economists, and international legal scholars.
To the lawyer the GATT provides a framework for analysis and
debate over the nature of international law itself, the relevance of
rules that seek to govern international relations, and the ability of a
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Clayton, Australia.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2 The GATT represents an organization as well as an agreement, although the for-
mer was not originally intended. As contemplated by a resolution of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council in February, 1946, the GATT was originally intended to be
merely an interim document in support of future tariff negotiations while a more perma-
nent organization, the International Trade Organization, was established. See R. HUDEC,
THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 9-10, 45-46 (1975). Although
the United States was the primary force behind the move toward establishing the proposed
International Trade Organization, it soon became apparent that the U.S. Congress would
not approve it. See id. at 53-55. The GATT, however, did not need Congressional ap-
proval to be effective. See id. at 60-65. Thus, already in place, the GATT filled the void in
tariff negotiations and quickly developed an institutional structure to deal with trade issues
on an on-going basis. For excellent synopses of the GAIT's history, see Rogoff & Gauditz,
The Provisional Application of International Agreements, 39 ME. L. REV. 29, 64 (1987);
Ehrenhaft, A U.S. View of the GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW. 146, 146-47 (1986).
3 Although the GATT was not intended to establish a permanent organization, see
supra note 2, it nonetheless contains some institutional elements. One of the GATT's pur-
poses was to provide rules and procedures to ensure that immediate tariff-reducing agree-
ments were not undermined through nontariff barriers created prior to the establishment
of the International Trade Organization. Hence the GATT contains various dispute reso-
lution procedures. See generally Jackson, GA TT as an Instrument for the Settlement of Trade Dis-
putes, 61 PROC. AM. Soc'Y ITrr'L L. 144 (1967) (outlining the various dispute resolution
mechanisms of the GATT).
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legalistic4 or rule-based system to prevent and resolve disputes as
they inevitably arise in today's complex and multifaceted interna-
tional trading relationships. Unlike politicians or economists, law-
yers have no incontrovertible intellectual jurisdiction in the field of
international economic relations between governments. The central
debate for lawyers in any sphere of international relations is whether,
and to what extent, legalistic attitudes may assist in furthering com-
mon goals. Law, however, is necessary in any domestic market-based
economic system to create and protect property rights, to support
agreements, and to prevent and resolve disputes. As a result, the
question arises whether these features of a legal system can readily
be transferred to an international context. Dispute resolution is a
major aspect of this question.
A dispute settlement mechanism such as the one contained in
the GATT5 is found typically in any agreement between parties that
4 In the remainder of this Perspective, the terms "legalism" and "pragmatism," and
their respective derivatives, are used to denote the competing views on the issue of the
appropriate role of dispute resolution processes. These terms are not intended to connote
any meanings in any particular sense. They are merely short-hand labels and contain their
own ambiguities and scope for pejorative application. To illustrate the differences in the
competing views, a pragmatist appears to a legalist to be nonidealistic and unprincipled;
conversely, a legalist appears to a pragmatist to be narrow-minded, having tunnel-vision,
and concerned only with the ordinary or technical meaning of words.
5 The central dispute settlement mechanism of the GATT is as follows:
Consultation(1) Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to,
and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such repre-
sentations as may be made by another contracting party with respect to any
matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
(2) The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a con-
tracting party, consult with any contracting party or parties in respect of any
matter for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution
through consultation under paragraph 1.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XXII, as amended by Protocol, Mar. 10, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 1787,
T.I.A.S. No. 3930, 278 U.N.T.S. 200.
Nullification or Impairment
(1) If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing
to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired
or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as
the result of (a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obli-
gations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another contracting
party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this
Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party
may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written
representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which
it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall
give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to
It.
(2) If no satisfactory adjustment is affected between the contracting
parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type
described in paragraph l(c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
,promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropri-
ate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be
concerned, or give a ruling on the matter as appropriate. The CON-
TRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties with the Eco-
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possess diverse interests and attitudes. The GATT's dispute settle-
ment processes have produced mixed success. During the current
Uruguay Round some adjustments to the GAT will be necessary.
Unfortunately, past debates over reform of the GATT's dispute reso-
lution mechanisms were consumed by the belief that various signato-
ries have irreconcilable views about the GATT's dispute resolution
functions. This Perspective critically examines these purported dif-
ferences and argues that most are inaccurate and misleading.6 In
addition, this Perspective argues that to concentrate negotiations
solely on recent procedural problems is wrong; the debate's focus
should be prospective and seek to prevent such future problems.
But the primary concern of this Perspective is to address the debate
over the appropriate function of the GATT's dispute resolution
mechanism.
The optimum role for the GATT's dispute settlement mecha-
nisms involves many issues. Feasibility has become a problem under
the current political and economic climate and the attitudes of the
GATT's key participants. This Perspective does not attempt to pre-
dict the type of dispute settlement agreement that may ultimately
emerge from the Uruguay Round. Rather, this Perspective provides
a format for sovereign states to escape from the circularity of past
debates and force the intellectual evaluation to advance. Specifically,
this Perspective identifies and evaluates the traditional concerns
about a legalistic approach to dispute settlement. It also determines
whether such a role is an essential element in international economic
law, and identifies the factors that demand such a role for a dispute
settlement process or that militate against or limit the potential for
nomic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate
inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider such consulta-
tion necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circum-
stances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a
contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other con-
tracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this
Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the
application to any contracting party of any concession or other obligation is
in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than 60
days after such action is taken to give written notice to the Executive Secre-
tary to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, of its intention to withdraw from this
Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day follow-
ing the day on which such notice is received by him.
Id., art. XXIII, as amended by Protocol, Mar. 10, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 1787, T.I.A.S. No. 3930, 278
U.N.T.S. 200. The term "contracting party" denotes the individual signatories of the
GATT. Its capitalized plural, "CONTRACTING PARTIES," refers to the collective body
of decisionmakers. Id., art. XXV.
6 While an economist may feel that substantive agreement on questions such as the
reduction of distortive trade subsidies, the proper limits for government interference in
trade, or reasonable parameters for domestic safeguard measures are more important for
the future of the GAT, improvements to the on-going procedural processes of the system
are vitally necessary to protect whatever substantive agreements that the GAI may affect.
Economics is a result-oriented discipline; it rarely identifies the processes necessary to
achieve and support results.
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such a role. 7
II. The Definition of Dispute Settlement
It is difficult to define "dispute settlement" and other key termi-
nology. Like so many of the GATT issues, any individual debate can
encompass fundamental constitutional and jurisprudential issues
that often overarch all other questions within the debate. It is diffi-
cult to discuss the appropriate role of dispute settlement in the
GATT system without gravitating towards progressively more ethe-
real problems such as the true nature of that system, what we mean
by international economic law, and what the potential for law is in
any international system. One necessary precondition to any empiri-
cal evaluation or serious analytical discussion is terminological re-
finement and resolution of key taxonomic questions.
What do we mean by a "dispute"? If we seek to examine actual
cases to determine the ability of the GATT's structure to handle dis-
putes, should we limit ourselves to Article XXIII complaints,8 to
panel reports generally,9 to matters formally raised at Council meet-
ings,' 0 to matters formally discussed between diplomatic missions,
7 At this stage, the author's own biases should be articulated. In the prescriptive
sense, the international legal scholar sees more than minimal potential for a legalist system
and invariably advocates development and improvement of the rules and processes. Thus
the task of the author is to identify an agenda for debate that may ultimately lead to
processes that better assist in the pacific resolution of international trade disputes within
the GATT context. This Perspective suggests that basic analysis can show why many of
the traditional criticisms of a dispute resolution model are not intellectually defensible.
Because of the consensual nature of the GATT negotiations, however, bad arguments
need to be dealt with just as much as good arguments. Once this has occurred, it will be
easier to embark upon the practical task of analyzing and devising appropriate procedures
to maximize the efficiency and equity of the dispute settlement system. Even here, the
need for a sophisticated conceptual analysis exists. It is important to be more than merely
responsive to existing problems. Unless a more rigorous analysis is undertaken, a tremen-
dous risk exists that when more obvious problems are solved, new ones will simply arise.
Should this occur, it could be quite harmful as new expectations would be misplaced dur-
ing the currency of future proceedings.
8 A number of the codes developed during the Tokyo Round also contain dispute
settlement procedures. While there may be long-term problems in having a number of
alternative dispute settlement processes, for the purposes of this Perspective it is fair to say
that these procedures build on the general format of Articles XXII and XXIII of the
GATT. This Perspective limits its scope to these two articles in order to examine the gen-
eral principles that relate to a dispute settlement process in an international economic
forum.
9 The GATT organization has developed a practice of submitting disputes to a panel
of experts, the members of which act in their individual capacities and not as representa-
tives of member nations. After the initiation of a complaint under Article XXIII, see supra
note 5 (quoting art. XXIII of the GATT), the matter is referred to panels, which investi-
gate the matter and attempt to reconcile the dispute. The panel reports its conclusions
and recommendations to the entire body of Contracting Parties, who then rule in the man-
ner set forth in Article XXIII:2. See supra note 5 (illustrating art. XXIII of the GATT). The
Contracting Parties generally adopt the panels' recommendations. See R. HUDEC, supra
note 2, at 74-96 (discussing the processes involved in panel reports).
10 The Council was established in 1960 to act as a standing supervisory body between
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or to any other disagreement known to the researcher? What do we
mean when we speak of a dispute as being "resolved" or "settled"?
Does this occur when a decision has been given or when the losing
party has taken all necessary action in response to the decision? If
the decision leads to the removal of only part of a protective mea-
sure, do we speak of this as a "settlement"? The answers to these
questions are likely to affect our results.
Value judgments on which rights the system should uphold
color our conclusions about the success of the dispute settlement
system. Are we concerned primarily with the rights of the com-
plaining party, the defending party, both equally, other contracting
parties interested in the particular issue, all the contracting parties,
or the system in its totality? When examining the results of various
dispute settlement processes, what do we see as the aim of the pro-
cess? It is often suggested that the main aim of the GATT dispute
settlement system is to restore the balance of advantages between
the parties. Does this mean that a settlement must be within GATT
norms? Is it meaningful to consider disputes in bilateral terms
within a multilateral trading system that seeks to effect an overall bal-
ance between a large number of contracting parties? These are obvi-
ously difficult questions and explain why most of the serious writings
on GATT issues tend to be broader than their working titles suggest.
Another difficulty, one that is often ignored or given insufficient
treatment, is the extent to which our answers to the above questions
are affected by our particular legal training and normative postulates
about our domestic legal systems. The most widely cited GATT
commentators come from Anglo-American legal jurisdictions,
although almost all of the commentators collaborate extensively with
commentators from other jurisdictions and legal systems."' When
preparing material designed to persuade a diverse group of readers
to shift their respective positions, it is necessary to ensure that the
readers are not alienated by the author's express, or more often im-
plicit, assumptions that normative prescriptions accepted within the
author's own domestic system are similarly valued by others.
Il1. Identifying the Arguments Against a Rule-Based System
The first step in refining the debate on dispute settlement within
the GATT system is to identify the main arguments that have been
raised against a legalist or rule-based dispute settlement system.
The aim at this stage is to identify the arguments in order to discredit
the more extreme positions. The competing views are the pragma-
sessions of the Contracting Parties. The Council has broad jurisdiction without any ex-
press treaty authority. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, 154-57 (1969).
11 See, e.g., Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round. Legal Aspects of
Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267 (1982).
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tist position that law plays no part in international trade relations
and the legalist position that a rule-based methodology solves all in-
ternational trade disputes. Although no serious commentators sub-
scribe to either of these views, disputants and negotiators in
diplomatic forums make these arguments to enhance their positions
in a particular discussion. The more desirable plane of debate is one
in which the parties assess the proper role of law in an international
economic system, without seeking an exact formulation. The inter-
national rules are one of a number'of relevant factors that govern
behavior in international economic relations. Their importance and
effect varies. The more important question is whether it is worth
maintaining the effort to formulate and improve a rule-based dispute
settlement system.
A. Trade Policy or Trade Law?
An argument often raised against a rule-based system is that
trade policy is not the province of law. Typically, this argument is
heard from politicians defending a protectionist measure and is not
likely to be heard from the same country's GATT representatives.
This argument comes from the belief that governments do not want
to constrain the power of industrial policy. Pejorative terminology is
an important part of the GATT debates. What constitutes industrial
policy to one contracting party is perceived as protectionism by
others.
Is government regulation of international trade discretionary
behavior? Discretions are' viewed by some as positive tools of eco-
nomic management rather than the means to respond to protection-
ist pressures. Sometimes this argument is redefined in terms of
sovereignty and suggests that the determination of macroeconomic
policy is part of each country's inalienable rights. This simplistic ar-
gument purports to negate the role of law in international economic
relations. But commentators have pointed out that true sovereignty
means effective sovereignty or the ability to achieve desired ends. 12
The argument also fails to recognize the difference between sover-
eignty of a sovereign and the sovereignty of the people, which
French and U.S. philosophers pointed out centuries ago.
While governments should consider macroeconomic variables
when trying to increase the welfare of their constituents, the actions
of one government can adversely affect the attainment of such goals
by other governments. Political scientists have shown that it is a
suboptimal strategy for individual governments to use protectionist
measures in order to obtain an advantage for the domestic economy
12 See, e.g., Tumlir, GATT Rules and Community Law-A Comparison of Economic and Legal
Functions, in 4 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT-STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC LAw 1-2 (1986).
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at the expense of foreign countries.' 3 When this strategy is adopted
by all the countries in the system, overall trade is affected to the det-
riment of each society's consumers. A system of proscriptive rules
such as the GATT aims to dissuade governments from following
trade policies that are disadvantageous to consumers. The issue is
not one of an organization usurping the sovereignty of a member
state. Rather, each party employs a cost/benefit analysis of the gains
to be made by contractually limiting its discretionary powers when
reciprocal promises are made.
The best example is international taxation. In every im-
port/export transaction there is more than one sovereign state that
usually has the right to tax the profits. Double taxation, however,
deters further trade. Most governments acknowledge this impedi-
ment and negotiate double tax treaties that set out rules to deter-
mine which of the two parties has the sole right to tax each type of
transaction. In one respect this is more far reaching than dispute set-
tlement under the GATT because the tax courts of each contracting
party interpret the Treaty in the case of a dispute. Under tax treaties
there may be no delegation to an independent arbiter and there is
the possibility that the other country's court can decide the matter.
Even if one concedes a substantial role for government discre-
tion in industrial policy, there are clear cases when government in-
tervention is not defensible under any economic theory. In Western
democratic economies, where internal pressure groups are often
able to influence government actions, an international rule system
acts as a constraint on governments choosing inappropriate eco-
nomic policies for reasons of short-term political expediency. Often
governments like to be "protected" from those pressures through
some binding system of rules. The serious question is whether pro-
visions can be drafted that identify and distinguish between accepta-
ble and unacceptable industrial policies. For example, the potential
of the GATT dispute settlement system would be greatly enhanced if
the contracting parties agreed on improved safeguard provisions, the
proper operation of the rules on developing countries, and improved
rules in the problem sectors such as agriculture, steel, and textiles.
There are a number of benefits thought to flow from a legalist
approach. Supporters of a rule-based system invariably point out
that such systems significantly enhance certainty.' 4 In any commer-
cial context certainty is a highly desirable goal for planning and deci-
sion making purposes. Long-term commercial relationships are
13 See generally Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. Sci.
REV. 306 (1981); Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the International Political
Economy, 28 INT'L STUD. Q. 5 (1984); Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of
the Law of International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501 (1985).
14 See, e.g. ,Jackson, The Birth of the GA TT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 LAw
AND POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21, 26 (1980).
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unlikely if parties behave unpredictably. In addition, when the con-
tracting parties are of vastly diverse sizes a rule-based system poten-
tially protects the weak against abuses of the system by major trading
nations.
These purported benefits, however, raise further questions. For
example, how important is certainty and by what other criteria
should we judge our system? The question of certainty as a goal of a
rule-based system should not be considered in isolation. Certainty
without equity is achieved through bilateral deals, which is what the
GATT seeks to end. It can be too easy to shift attention from the
certainty of legal norms to the attainment of certainty of trade pat-
terns. Increased liberalization of trade means greater reliance on
market forces, which in turn leads to shifts in comparative advantage.
As a result, future trade patterns are uncertain. Rather, we are con-
cerned with the certainty of a rule-based system and the certainty
that promises will be kept. Such a system in the international context
aims at achieving stability and standardization as the two key ele-
ments of the concept of certainty. Stability means that rules are not
changed without proper notice and that interpretations are not
changed arbitrarily. Standardization ensures that public goods are
available and rules are created and applied with as much consistency
between nation states as possible.
In supporting rules as a means of protecting weaker countries,
we must examine the power content of rules because rules and
power are not mutually exclusive. Rules are negotiated and drafted
in an environment where power can be and is exercised. Interna-
tional economic rules, like many domestic legal systems, are
designed or operable in a way that best protects the powerful. This
is achieved through drafting,15 escape procedures,1 6 or operation.17
The present situation demands that more attention be directed to
this issue. Any changes to the rules within the GATT must be ac-
cepted by the major trading nations and blocs. It is not difficult to
conceive of agreements between the major trading nations 18 that sat-
15 The drafting of "soft" agricultural laws is one such example. Difficulties have
arisen, however, in applying the tests contained in Article XVI to agricultural subsidies.
One such difficulty concerns the meaning of Article XVI's phrase "more than an equitable
share of world export trade." See GATT, REPORT OF PANEL ON EC REFUNDS ON EXPORTS OF
SUGAR, 26th Supp. B.I.S.D. 290 (1980); GAFT, REPORT OF PANEL ON EC REFUNDS ON Ex-
PORTS OF SUGAR, COMPLAINT BY BRAZIL, 27th Supp. B.I.S.D. 69 (1981).
16 See, e.g., GATT, supra note 1, art. XXV:5.
17 The effective veto power provided by a census model is one such example.
Although Article XXV:3 & 4 stipulate that decisions are to be taken by majority vote, the
reality has been for both the Contracting Parties and the Council to make decisions by
consensus only. This approach was affirmed in 1982. See GATT, 29th Supp. B.I.S.D. 16
(1983).
18 The major trading nations include the United States, the members of European
Economic Community, and Japan. These nations comprise the major spheres of economic
decision-making. A considerable amount of bilateral discussion, tension, and compromise
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isfy each of their governments' short-term goals. But this may be
done at the expense of rules that fully protect all members of the
GATT. In the GATT context there is no history of arguments of
duress or undue influence in forcing agreements. These arguments
should not be raised within GATT disputes, but should serve only as
a reminder of the potential for overlap between rules and power po-
sitions. Additional considerations include how rules contain a power
content, to what extent this has occurred in the past, and whether
there are any negotiating procedures that could minimize this phe-
nomenon. These questions are appropriate for each country's policy
makers to consider when defining positions on various proposals.
For example, the so called "new reciprocity"' 9 advocated by some
sectors is a gross misinterpretation of a fundamental GATT princi-
ple, which means in practice that negotiated rules are unlikely to be
based on free and fair agreement and should be shunned by offerees.
Similar criticisms have been levied at voluntary export restraints,
20
which have proliferated in recent years.
Another problem is the appropriate constitutional approach to
constraining internal pressure groups. Is an international treaty the
best method or should attention be turned to domestic constitu-
tional reform?2 1 This question raises more central questions regard-
ing the nature and role of nation states. Domestic executive and
administrative structures, and principles of judicial review provide a
framework to test the hypothesis that domestic reforms are a more
effective method of constraining internal pressure groups than inter-
national treaties. There is also the argument that if free trade is
meant to facilitate peace, governments may want to maintain flexibil-
ity so they can vary their responses in international relations and not
be constrained by legislation.
exists among these nations, some of which is seen as being contrary to GATT norms. See,
e.g., Arrangement Between the Government of Japan and the United States of America
Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products, Sept. 2, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1409 (Nov. 4,
1986). That raises the issue of the relationship between rules and power.
19 The concept of the "new reciprocity" is intended to achieve bilateral parity in mar-
ket access for classes of goods. It provides more protection to domestic markets from
goods that come from countries that do not allow U.S. products comparable access to their
markets. Cline, "Reciprocity ".A A New Approach to Wlorld Trade Policy?, in 2 POLICY ANALYSES
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 7 (1982). The former approach to "reciprocity" referred to
a negotiated matching of particular changes in protection. Id.
20 Voluntary export restraints (VERs), a mechanism by which a foreign trading part-
ner limits its exports to the United States, and orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs), a
mechanism by which the United States regulates restraints on imports, are examples of
what are called "grey area measures." They may involve bilateral agreements to limit ex-
ports between governments or industries and at times are said to be unilateral decisions by
exporting interests. Because they rarely result from the visible actions of the importing
country, some may argue that such agreements do not violate the GATT. However, no
serious scholar supports this argument.
21 The writings of constitutional economists such as James Buchanan have become
influential on these questions of political economy. See generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TUL-
LOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1968);J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY (1975).
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An evaluation of any area of GATT operations soon becomes a
debate embracing much of international law and economics.
Some of the above arguments suggest limitations on the poten-
tial for a rule-based system. Nevertheless, an assertion that trade
policy should not be the province of international law is a questiona-
ble statement. To the extent that law plays a part in the regulation of
international trade, a dispute settlement mechanism becomes a nec-
essary element. A legal system must be more than mere words on
paper, but the mechanism does not need to be an elaborate adver-
sarial model under the present or any other format. It is merely a
means of supporting the argument that there must be some dispute
settlement system in the organization.
B. Is There "Law" in International Economic Law?
The second category of criticisms often leveled at a rule-based
international system consists of the perceived defects of interna-
tional economic law. Some argue that international law is not "law"
in the true sense. Others argue that the rules are invariably "soft"
and do not afford a mechanism for objective dispute settlement. 22
This Perspective is not the appropriate forum to debate the issue of
whether international law is law. The other questions are subsets of
that issue. These questions are heard in the context of GAIT de-
bates and are addressed here.
When discussing the role of sanctions, it is necessary to clarify
the nature of GATT rules. Are they merely contractual or do they
have a quasi-penal character? When we speak of sanctions in a legal
system we usually think of a criminal system. In a contractual sense
we think more of damages or other remedies. Sanctions in the crimi-
nal law, at least in Anglo-American systems, are aimed at deterrence
rather than compensation of the victim. The remedies available in a
civil system also have a deterrent element, but are not punishment
oriented. They fix the harm occasioned, or declare that the harm
stop. Civil-type remedies are more realistic aims for the GATT.
An international system does not have the enforcement, coer-
cive, and deterrent effects commonly found in domestic systems.
Nevertheless, an international system can affect behavior by making
breach perceptually a less beneficial course of action. This is an un-
certain effect because it operates differently on each contracting
party. The motives behind reactions also vary. Some contracting
parties comply because their domestic legal systems require it. The
authority and sanctions of the domestic legal structure can en-
courage adherence to the international rules. Other contracting par-
ties value their status as perceived adherents to international rules.
22 See, e.g., Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic "Soft Law", 163 RECUEIL DES
COURS 165-246 (1979).
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Others are sensitive to an adverse explicit finding. Some are con-
cerned about the remedies the GATT dispute settlement process can
ultimately sanction.23 Some comply because they always wanted to,
but needed an excuse for opposing lobby groups to explain why the
government has ignored their pleas. Others comply because of the
adverse publicity associated with breach.
On analytical grounds, the absence of an effective sanction does
not preclude a dispute settlement system from working in the inter-
national arena. A system with effective adjudicatory and enforce-
ment mechanisms is more likely to minimize the number of disputes.
Nevertheless, the absence of adequate mechanisms does not mean
that international law has no effect. The twin statements that the
GATT has no coercive powers and that the dispute settlement mech-
anism relies on the will of the parties are both true and misleading.
They are true in the sense that the matter ends if the disputants de-
cide not to accept panel findings. They are misleading because they
suggest that the level of will is independent of the operation of the
dispute settlement system.
The relevance of law should not be judged by the actions of a
losing contracting party in one case. In addition, it should not be
judged solely by the percentage of acceptance of adverse verdicts
over a forty year period, although such a figure is relevant. The rele-
vance of law must be judged by analyzing what happened and what is
likely to have occurred in the absence of such systems. These judg-
ments combine elements of empirical, analytical, and impressionistic
analysis. Politicians, delegates, secretariat members, and academics
have different perspectives. Each should realize that their percep-
tions are colored by their backgrounds. 24 In this context, we must
acknowledge another constraint that operates on most modern com-
mentators. It is difficult to rely solely on documentation in interna-
tional organizations to determine what actually occurred. As time
advances, however, it becomes extremely difficult to corroborate ex-
plicit material by reference to actual participants.
In furthering this aspect of the debate it is appropriate to criti-
cally examine all GATT disputes to test the hypothesis of whether
23 This possible perception, however, is less likely to occur because of the rarity of
sanctions. Although the 1979 Understanding contemplates compensation as a possible
element in a settlement, see GATT, 26th Supp. B.I.S.D. 210 (1980), and although the
Contracting Parties may ultimately authorize the complainant to suspend concessions or
other obligations in retaliation, see GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII, only one instance of
authorized retaliation has occurred and some doubt exists as to whether or not the right
was fully utilized. See GATT, REPORT OF WORKING PARTY ON NETHERLANDS ACTION UNDER
ARTICLE XXIII:2 TO SUSPEND OBLIGATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1st Supp. B.I.S.D. 62-
64 (1953).
24 The problem of perspective is exacerbated in an organization such as the GATT,
where considerable reliance has to be placed on secondary sources authored by key
personnel.
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the system has been effective in the past. An examination of the his-
tory of the GATT shows that many disputes have been resolved
notwithstanding that there are neither elaborate sanctions or reme-
dies commensurate with those in domestic criminal and civil systems.
Some disputes have not been resolved by the system. Other funda-
mental ones have not led to formal panel proceedings, probably be-
cause the parties acknowledge the inadequacy of the system for
certain types of disputes.25 Successes have occurred, but the more
difficult question is whether the areas of success are sufficiently im-
portant to justify the effort involved.
Commentators have argued that the dispute settlement process
works because in almost all instances when a complainant has
pushed the issue, a panel has proceeded to make a determination
that is invariably in favor of that complainant. Others disagree and
argue that the panel process has worked only for less significant dis-
putes. These are the real issues as opposed to the simplistic view that
international economic law never has any real effect. These factors
suggest that the appropriate debate is about trying to identify a mini-
mum level of effectiveness of a GATT dispute settlement procedure
and to determine whether increased endeavours are worthwhile on a
cost/benefit basis. This occurs only after a rigorous examination of
the recent trends along the lines of Professor Hudec's seminal
work. 26
There are many so called "agreements" in the international
sphere that do not represent a consensus among the contracting par-
ties. Too often agreements are constructed to hide the lack of con-
sensus among the negotiating parties in order to allow the
negotiators to be seen as reaching some explicit mutual position.
Even when real agreement occurs, an international system is less
likely to be built on consistent policy foundations than a domestic
system. The fundamental principles make the rules open to inter-
pretation and make clear and explicit drafting a difficult if not impos-
sible task.
The "cornerstones" of the GATT include nondiscrimination,27
unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, 28 the directive
25 Trade problems can be dealt with in other ways than through the dispute settle-
ment system. For example, the waiver power or renegotiation of schedules could be used.
At least two disputes, however, have seen the dispute settlement system used to address
"wider" issues. The first was the Uruguay recourse to Article XXIII. See GATT, I Ith
Supp. B.I.S.D. 95-102 (1963). The second saw a proposal by the European Community
(EC) in April 1983 to establish a working party under Article XXIII:2 to examine features
of the Japanese economy which had allegedly impaired EC benefits. The complaint was
not pursued. GAIT, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1983 49 (1983).
26 See generally, R. HUDEC, supra note 2.
27 The desirability of nondiscrimination in international trade has led to the most-
favored-nation clause. See infra note 28.
28 The GATF's most-favored-nation clause applies only to products upon which:
custom duties [or] charges of any kind [have been] imposed on, or in connec-
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that tariffs should be the preferred protective device, the promotion
of transparency, the concept of national treatment, 29 and the utiliza-
tion of reciprocity as a means of promoting compliance and develop-
ment of freer trade.30 At times these concepts conflict with the
express terminology of some of the substantive rules. They may
even conflict with each other. If this occurs, their relative ranking is
important. This is complicated because there is some inherent
vagueness in describing all as cornerstones. Some are ends in them-
selves and others are the preferred means of attaining those ends in
the field of international relations. This adds to the problem facing
the legalist. The pragmatist argues that if the rules merely embody
the means, and if the ends are obtainable in another way, there is no
need to adhere to the rules.
The sanctity of the specific rules are also undermined by demon-
strating the inconsistent attitudes about end goals. For example, if
unconditional MFN treatment is seen as a cornerstone of the GATT,
the development of free trade areas, special treatment for develop-
ing countries, the growing use of nontariff barriers, grey area meas-
ures, "free riders," and the conditional MFN practices during the
Tokyo Round render the concept largely irrelevant.
When there are trade-offs between equity and efficiency or when
realpolitik has precluded the first best solution, participants change
their attitude towards the role of law. Some take this further and ar-
gue that in the absence of unambiguous explicit drafting, interna-
tional law cannot be effective. This is a further example of a real
problem being misrepresented in a way that engenders an all or
nothing debate. The effectiveness of law is measured in no small
part by compliance. In a system such as the GATT and when en-
forcement powers are nonexistent, compliance is in part a product of
the will of the parties.
The issue then is to what extent the law and a dispute settlement
mechanism can fortify that will and protect it against sectoral inter-
tion with importation or exportation .... any advantage, favor, privilege, or
'immunity [has been] granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immedi-
ately and unconditionally to the products originating on or destined for its
territories of all other contracting parties.
J. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 249-50 (citing GATT, supra note 1, art. I, para. 1).
29 The concept of "national treatment" is primarily embodied in GATT, art. III. This
concept means that imported goods will be accorded the same treatment as goods having
local origin with respect to matters under governmental control, such as taxation and reg-
ulation. By way of contrast, the most-favored-nation clause only requires a government to
treat all foreign goods equally, although domestic products might be favored. J. JACKSON,
supra note 10, at 273. For a complete discussion of the concept of "national treatment,"
see id. at 273-303.
30 Article XXVII requires GAIT trade negotiations to be conducted on a "reciprocal
and mutually advantageous basis." GATT, supra note I, art. XXVII. Thus, tariff conces-
sions by one country will be met by a reciprocal concession of equal value from the other
country. For a full discussion of this occurrence, see J.JACKSON, supra note 10, at 240-45.
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ests and pressure groups. On a practical level the issue is whether it
is better to take a questionable consensus and try to make it work
through adjudication and, if necessary, expansive interpretation by
the adjudicators, or wait until there is pure consensus expressed in
clear terms. It is difficult to get sovereign states, anxious to protect
their autonomy, to agree to subjugate themselves to expansive inter-
pretation. On the other hand, clear unambiguous consensus is rare
in international economic matters.
There is, however, an important factor that supports a rule-
based system. A legal system is not a static model. A legal system
has a role to play even when a clear consensus has been achieved. A
policy adopted by any single contracting party is rarely a product of
domestic consensus. Rather, policies are often the result of trade-offs
between interests or from the party choosing to benefit some at the
expense of others. In the trade arena freer trade measures come at
the expense of domestic manufacturing and producing interests,
which are unlikely to cease demands for protection because the
GATT or a GATT-inspired agreement has been negotiated by the
central government. To argue that there can be no law without con-
sensus and that once there is consensus there is no longer a need for
law overlooks the importance of law in protecting consensus. In a
system such as the GATT when consensus frequently results from
trade-offs of polarized positions, such consensus needs protection
from casuistic arguments regarding drafting ambiguities or changed
circumstances.
The system is also needed when it appears that the parties are in
agreement, but the drafting is unclear or ambiguous, or the parties
fail to turn their minds to the specific ways that disputes arise. The
drafting of international agreements should be as tight as possible,
but some degree of "softness" is not an excuse for failure to adjudi-
cate. In particular, macroeconomic principles and "fairness" re-
quirements cannot easily be converted into rule formulations that
have mathematical precision. Systemic elements are necessary to
support the agreed upon rules. Dispute settlement rules and mecha-
nisms are elements that properly support a legal system.
Even when a "watered down" rule is developed to gloss over a
fundamental difference in attitudes between parties, there is a prob-
lem in dismissing it as "soft" and of limited normative effect. To the
party that tries to minimize its content this is an admirable result.
On the other hand, for the country that grudgingly accepts a soft
proscriptive formula this negates the presence of even a minimally
binding commitment. Agricultural producers who signed the Subsi-
dies Code in the Tokyo Round were not happy at the ultimate draft-
ing, but they would have been less happy to learn that the document
has no normative effect.
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Again, there are terminological questions that are likely to give
rise to practical problems. A legal system should normally be distin-
guished from the legal rules that are a subset of that system. In the
case of the GATT these two are not easy to differentiate because
there is no separate structure or constitution. The entity, proce-
dures, and substantive provisions are all derived from the Agree-
ment itself. The GATF is a legal system without the constitutional
and functional stability of domestic systems; therefore, its semantic,
contextual, and syntactical ambiguities cannot be resolved by refer-
ence to higher constitutional documents. Nevertheless, much effort
has been expended to determine the core concepts of the GATT.
This raises issues about the appropriate legal principles for
resolving GAT disputes and the hierarchy of such principles.
There are tensions due to other factors such as the inclusion of a
substantive concept, namely "nullification and impairment," in Arti-
cle XXIII.3' Such a provision broadens the ambit of the dispute set-
tlement function of the GAT and takes it well outside the ambit of
activity of domestic dispute resolution processes. Against this back-
ground, questions about procedure and the appropriate timing and
methodology for negotiating improvements become more difficult.
While these questions are important, they relate to the appropriate
design of a dispute settlement system rather than the merits of such a
system.
C. Trade Law Versus Trade Diplomacy
An additional argument suggests that law is inappropriate in an
international sphere because an undue concern with rules leads to
rigidity and tension between independent sovereign states. In a
legal system rigidity is a pejorative term used as a replacement for
"stability" or "certainty." Laws that are certain and become less ap-
propriate as circumstances change are described as unduly rigid.
The rigidity of law is dependent, in part, on the presence or ab-
sence of mechanisms for dealing with changed circumstances. The
amendment powers of the GATT are difficult to invoke, but this does
not prove rigidity. Because the GATT has generous exceptions such
as an escape clause 32 and a waiver provision,3 3 it is not an unduly
rigid legal system. Increased rules do not lead to increased tensions.
31 The central concept that underlies Article XXIII is that of "nullification or impair-
ment." This can encompass complaints based on breach of GATT rules and in addition,
nonviolation actions which still could not have been reasonably anticipated by the com-
plaining country and which in turn can be said to "nullify or impair" benefits that it has
under the Agreement. See supra note 5 (quoting art. XXIII of the GATT).
32 Article XIX allows emergency action where as a result of unforeseen develop-
ments, increased imports "cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers."
GAIT, supra note i, art. XIX.
33 The GATT allows Contracting Parties, in "exceptional circumstances," to waive
obligations otherwise imposed upon a member. Thus, waivers can have an "amending
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The GATT is a system without any effective sanctions and operates
on a fully consensual basis. Thus, law is unlikely to increase interna-
tional tension to an undesirable level. There is real tension in some
disputes, but this is more likely to be a product of the precipitating
actions themselves and not the law.
The rules of the GATT can be blamed if they do not reflect the
intent of the parties, or if they encourage intransigent positions that
militate against resolution, or if they allow minor disputes to escalate
out of proportion. Examination of past disputes suggests that there
are only two tenable arguments that may support this view. First, it
is said that it is undesirable for different parties to have different atti-
tudes about the role of law and the normative effect of the rules. All
parties should be discouraged from inflating or deflating the impor-
tance of the dispute settlement system. This Perspective addresses
that concern.
Second, it is argued that the particular form of the dispute set-
tlement procedure, designed on the model of Western democratic
legal systems, unduly upsets those members whose philosophy is to
avoid labelling a culprit in a litigious environment. The membership
of the GATT is far less homogeneous than at its inception.3 4 The
political and sociological differences among present contracting par-
ties are addressed later in this Perspective because such arguments
relate to the attitudes to and the form of dispute settlement, and not
necessarily to the desirability of a dispute settlement mechanism. In
addition, as a research methodology the domestic system of any state
propounding this second argument should be examined carefully.
Some countries that argue against adversarial processes employ fea-
tures of them in their domestic systems.3 5
D. Legalism I'ersus Pragmatism
The next general group of arguments against a rule-based sys-
tem is that a pragmatic approach is better than a legalist approach.
This overlaps with a number of other arguments. The overlap with
the previous headings results from the claim that a pragmatic ap-
proach deals with policy issues better and is preferable because of
the general defects of an international economic regulatory system.
Others argue that the GATT is effective only as a forum and that
within that forum states can negotiate anything. Others seek support
effect." Jackson, supra note 14, at 33. See also J. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 541-52 (for a
fuller discussion of the waiver clause and its effects).
34 See Appendix A for a list of the members of GATT as of June 30, 1988.
35 While pragmatists are often embarrassed by their own domestic legal systems, it is
also important to identify the historic influences. It may be wrong to presume that there is
the same attitude toward law as in the country of influence. Countries forced to adopt
particular legal systems or who developed rapidly simply to facilitate trade, may not accept
the objective need for legalism.
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in the sociological and jurisprudential differences and argue that dis-
pute settlement, as perceived by its supporters, is an Anglo-Ameri-
can inspired concept whereas effective commerce is better facilitated
by conciliatory mechanisms.
The preliminary response to these arguments returns to ques-
tions of certainty. The presence of some binding rules means that
negotiations cannot be reopened whenever it suits one party's partic-
ular position. Commercial relations are more certain because there
can be greater reliance on the fact that promises are likely to be kept.
Not all disputes are a result of balanced and tenable competing atti-
tudes. More often than not, disputes arise from a clear unilateral
breach. This raises questions of equity, certainty, and the fundamen-
tal rights of contracting parties. If a party has been wronged, regard-
less of whether it is commercially prudent to take some of the loss in
order to return to profitable trade, should the law prohibit that party
from seeking full redress if that is what is sought? In response to
suggestions that a conciliatory model is always better the question is
whether those countries that support a conciliatory model follow that
model to the exclusion of the legal process or as a preferred first op-
tion. If the latter is the case, this goes to the question of the appro-
priate procedures of a dispute settlement system and not to the
necessity for such a system at all.
E. GA TT-Specific Issues
The criticisms discussed above apply generally to all areas of in-
teraction between rules and international economic relations. The
next group of arguments address specific problems in the GATT
context. Some argue that the Article XXIII approach is unfair be-
cause GATT rights and obligations are now unbalanced and the dis-
pute settlement system does not treat all "victims" equally. Such
imbalances are due to several differences between countries. GATT
rules do not operate equally for developing countries and industrial-
ized countries, for minor traders and major traders, or for certain
sectors such as agriculture compared to manufacturing.
There is also the view that the GATT has not dealt with certain
issues such as the formation of the European Economic Community
(EEC)36 and the treatment of nonmarket economies. Others have
argued that there are imbalances between different industrialized
countries, particularly where the EEC is concerned. When compar-
ing the performance of the United States and the EEC, tenable argu-
ments are raised that show balances in either direction. The United
36 The EEC consists of: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, and
Portugal. M. KELLY, N. KIRMANI, M. XAFI, C. BOONEKAMP & P. WINGLEE, ISSUES AND DE-
VELOPMENTS IN WORLD TRADE POLICY 88 (1988).
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States argues it has given more because it made all the early tariff
concessions, while the EEC members hid behind balance-of-pay-
ments exemptions. Some commentators argue that the EEC is at a
disadvantage because it does not have grandfather rights or an agri-
culture waiver, and because the rules were written in a way that was
biased towards U.S. interests.
GATT dispute resolution mechanisms deal with certain types of
disputes better than others. The corollary of this is that certain
countries are better served by the GATT if their paramount interests
are in those areas. The system should maximize equality of treat-
ment, but differences do not obviate the desirability of a dispute set-
tlement mechanism. Notwithstanding the fact that certain classes of
disputes are inadequately served by the rules and processes and no
matter which member you are dealing with, there are some things
member states do which are indefensible breaches deserving the ap-
probation of laws. This suggests why a dispute settlement system is
desirable.
In responding to a member who argues that the GATT rules are
imbalanced, it is worthwhile to examine whether that country always
utilizes this argument or does so only when it is "defending" a com-
plaint. Many of the GATT members have been complainants under
Article XXIII and rarely articulate such a view in that context. Fur-
thermore, even if some differences in rights and obligations are only
identifiable, these are unfair if unintended and unbalanced. For ex-
ample, if GATT members intend that certain GATT rules should not
apply to developing countries, it is fair to make it harder to bring
complaints against developing countries. Most industrialized coun-
tries hotly contest this position. It does raise the more general issue,
however, that if there is no consensus between two categories of con-
tracting parties over the operation of the dispute settlement system
in a particular sector, there is no unintended imbalance. In the
GATT context "balance" refers to a global balance of rights and ob-
ligations and does not occur within every permutation of disputants
and sectors.
Because the neo-classical economic position is that unilateral
compliance with sensible trade regulations is of itself beneficial, any
increased compliance is efficient. The argument is at best one of eq-
uity versus efficiency. Questions of equity become complex when we
deal with states and their citizens. Increased and imbalanced compli-
ance is equitable if it helps that particular country's citizens.
Some of the specific arguments voiced regarding the GATT are
aspects of the more general questions discussed above. For exam-
ple, commentators have suggested that whatever the true status of
international "law," the GATT is not a true legal system. The argu-
ment that the GATT is not law is that there is no permanency about
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the GATT agreements. Contracting parties agree only to be bound
by rules that they continue to agree apply to them. As a result, a
party to a dispute may argue that the interpretation suggested by the
other party is unacceptable because the first party would never have
agreed to it at the time of initial negotiation and does not agree to it
now. This argument is unduly static. Even if a contracting party can-
not achieve pure consensual positions in a system when parties only
reach agreement after they effect trade-offs, and even if all real
agreements occur only when parties are already at the "to be
agreed" position, law and dispute settlement are still necessary to
protect that consensus.
In the real world any static consensus is a product of a myriad of
competing factors. As circumstances change either the factors
change or their relative weight changes. Just as international law em-
anating from custom becomes law with a prescriptive effect in its own
right, the GATT and the Codes should also become law, regardless
of whether they are merely codifications of custom. To argue that
the GATT is essentially a contractual organization does not imply
that it is inappropriate to apply any legalist norms to the behavior of
individuals. A contract, by itself, is a legalist creation. Parties to a
contract are not normally allowed to unilaterally determine the ambit
of their contractual obligations.
The third GATT-specific argument against a rule-based system
is that in the absence of true and meaningful consensus there is no
role for a dispute settlement procedure. This argument equates with
the argument that there is no effective law without consensus and
when there is consensus there is no need for law. This is the static
argument criticized above. On a narrower level this argument re-
lates to timing. Its proponents have argued that contracting parties
should not worry about dealing with dispute settlement issues until
there is a real underlying consensus on the substantive aspects of the
GATT. An allied argument is that legalism is rarely contained within
appropriate boundaries, and rampant legalism precludes consensus.
Some see lawyers and the legal system as encouraging an industry
based on finding loopholes in explicit rules in order to make gains at
the expense of others.
In the GATT system protectionism is the clearest example of
lawyers finding loopholes in explicit rules to make gains at the ex-
pense of others. Protectionism is accomplished in a way that pro-
vides no real gain to the perpetrator of the measure. Before the
GATT there was not a system where participants behaved appropri-
ately until rules enticed them to behave differently. The GATT was
created in response to damaging behavior in the years between the
two World Wars. The rules, therefore, are a means of addressing
real problems and directing behavior accordingly. The presence of
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laws and a dispute settlement process does not stop parties from ex-
pending energy to make gains through manipulation of the rules.
This is not an argument against the legal model, however. It is a
limitation of a legal model and one that needs to be guarded against.
In domestic legal systems the most effective means of discourag-
ing such casuistic practices is for the judiciary to employ expansive
purposive interpretation techniques. Otherwise, the limitations of
language are manipulated by skilled lawyers who undermine even
the most explicit and well-drafted agreements. In an organization
such as the GATT when the adjudicatory body is not fully independ-
ent and when independent sovereign states feel uneasy about dele-
gating any decision-making function, there is the real possibility that
a methodology of dispute settlement that is feasible is inadequate to
dissuade parties from following such practices.
Whether now is the appropriate time to negotiate major changes
in the dispute settlement system is unclear. Questions regarding the
timing of the GATT negotiations are usually not dealt with on an
academic level and invariably reflect trade-off agreements between
major parties. For example, it is conceivable that the United States
would be willing to make certain "concessions" in return for a "fast-
track" agreement on at least some services issues. The fact that dis-
pute settlement is nonsubstantive is a good issue to "get the ball
rolling." On the other hand, many negotiators worry about agreeing
to major changes in this area without having an idea of the other
substantive changes made. If they agree, they are subject to binding
agreements at a time when they are unable to advise their superiors
on the ramifications of such agreements.
The timing of the debate on the dispute settlement function of
the GATT could be resolved under the above scenario. Assuming
that at least some contracting parties determine their response to the
timing issue on more direct or purist grounds, there is a tenable ar-
gument that it is preferable to deal with dispute settlement questions
before substantive issues. If this debate is carried out in an abstract
setting so that negotiation does not occur at a time when parties au-
tomatically identify themselves as substantive "winners" or "losers,"
a more effective mechanism is possible. Contracting parties who
think they have fared badly in the negotiations on substantive issues
may hold back on any advances on the dispute settlement front to
counterbalance their new and undesired obligations.
The contrary hypothesis is also possible and while considering
it, it is important to question what is meant by "consensus." A dis-
pute settlement system does not operate in a vacuum. It operates on
substantive laws. The merit of the dispute settlement system is pro-
portional to the equity and consensual nature of those laws, but inva-
riably it is a question of degree. As stated above, real consensus in
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the GATT context is a contractual consensus usually based on give
and take. It is rarely, if ever, a result of identical attitudes to a partic-
ular issue by all contracting parties. A dispute settlement system has
the function of protecting and developing, regardless of the present
consensus and equity. If one defines consensus to mean identical
attitudes at the time of the dispute, one has an unattainable concept
upon which to base a legal system.
In the GAT context, the fact that panel reports are adopted if
accepted unanimously shows that the reality of consensus encom-
passes both the formal rules themselves and the effect of the dispute
settlement procedure on those rules. The necessary consensus is as
much about realizing the costs of autarkic or anarchistic practices
and the need to limit sovereignty to protect public goods as it is
about constructing specific agreements on substantive issues. The
approach to taxation of international transactions provides a good
example. Most nations have understood the need for contractual
limitations on their powers to tax to further international commerce.
The fact that a Round is under way obviously makes such issues
less important. All key questions need to be considered during the
Uruguay Round including dispute settlement. Like other issues, dis-
pute settlement should be debated as soon as possible so there is
adequate time to research, evaluate, and negotiate. In fact the par-
ties are trying to complete a "fast track" or "early harvest" dispute
settlement negotiation. This has been held up by concurrent negoti-
ations on substantive issues such as agricultural subsidies.
If the GATT is to have any real place in an effective international
order, some key agreements need to come out of the Uruguay
Round. Too much of modern trade relations is perceived as being in
response to the U.S. deficit and the Government's view of the eco-
nomic responsibilities of Japan, the EEC, and the Federal Republic
of Germany. The discussions and most of the suggested solutions
are largely bilateral. The dispute settlement process is one feature of
the multilateral nature of the GATT organization. An agreement to
improve dispute settlement would be an important act of faith in that
process. An early agreement in a key substantive area such as subsi-
dies or safeguards would be an even better act of faith. Such sub-
stantive changes would be hard fought, would require give and take
on all sides, and are likely to come, if at all, towards the end of the
Round. Because of the contractual nature of change, it is desirable
to have an effective legal system to support such a contract if it
comes.
If the contracting parties pay their "price" for a particular sub-
stantive agreement and attention is given to supportive rules such as
the dispute settlement issue, one party may find that the results of
the latter negotiation will unbalance the initial bargain. The Tokyo
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Round, with its piecemeal approach to dispute settlement, revealed
additional problems of dealing with procedural matters after sub-
stantive issues. The whole history of the GATT, the circumstances
of its creation and its eventual status as an organization with a less
than optimal organizational structure, provides persuasive argu-
ments against seeking to effect substantive changes without ensuring
that there are prior or concurrent systemic developments to support
those changes.
F. Philosophical Perspectives of Various Parties
Perceived political, jurisprudential, and sociological differences
between contracting parties also precludes consensus on the dispute
resolution issue. These factors are a key reason why some of the
debates in the past have been repetitive and unproductive. Different
contracting parties mean different things when they speak of sover-
eignty, equity, the nature of the GATT, and the role of law. Further-
more, constitutional and structural issues mean that a GATT
agreement affects each contracting party's domestic activities differ-
ently. The ultimate effect of GATT rules depends on the constitu-
tion of each country, the sophistication of the administrative law
system, the availability of domestic judicial review, and the attitude
of the judiciary towards the domestic application of GATT rules.
Different contracting parties have different constitutional struc-
tures and different attitudes toward international law, treaties, panel
reports, and the operation of domestic laws that emanate from the
GATF agreements. 37 Antidumping laws are a good example. Coun-
tries with advanced administrative law systems find stronger limita-
tions placed on government antidumping activities. 38 Other
countries do not have any internal mechanism for challenging ad-
ministrative discretions. To further the debate in this area each con-
tracting party must examine, with greater respect, the legal systems
of other parties to determine if there is some common ground inter-
nally or in the attitude of the role and status of an international legal
order.
Recently, commentators have examined the domestic effect of
international obligations in important jurisdictions such as the
37 See generally Petersmann, International and European Foreign Trade Law: GA TT Dispute
Settlement Proceedings Against the EEC, 22 C.M.L. REV. 441 (1985) [hereinafter Petersmann,
GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings Against the EEC]; Bourgeois, Effects of International Agree-
ments in European Community Law: Are the Dice Cast?, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1250 (1984);
Petersmann, Application of GATT by the Court ofJustice of the European Communities, 20 C.M.L.
REV. 397 (1983); Steenbergen, The Status of GATTin Community Law, 15J. WORLD TRADE L.
337 (198 1);Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in U.S. Domestic Law, 66 MIcH.
L. REV. 249 (1967).
38 This may explain, in part, why the United States, Canada, Australia, and the EEC
have utilized the GATT's approach in developing much of their domestic antidumping
legislation.
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United States,Japan, and the EEC. 39 These commentators have con-
centrated on the preliminary stage of identifying and clarifying the
various rules and explaining the resistance to substantive agreement
by those members who have a complex decision-making structure or
who perceive that their internal legal system forces them to comply
with their obligations more than their trading partners. These fac-
tors help explain why a number of members are reluctant to agree on
a formalized dispute settlement function. At the same time, mem-
bers support the argument that it is better to obtain consensus on
the procedural matters before addressing substantive issues. In any
event, common positions must be sought. These positions are more
likely when the parties are better informed about each others' real
attitudes to law.
Nevertheless, philosophical differences should not be over-
valued. Relationships between parties with diverse ideologies and
who protect their sovereign autonomy are based on the binding con-
tract and the need for predictability to support on-going commercial
relationships. Bargains are necessary to create surplus value. For
this to occur, however, the bargains must be kept. Rules facilitate
bargains by promoting the certainty that those bargains will be kept.
They also help create and protect surplus value.
In private trading relationships, the pragmatist argues that bar-
gains are kept whenever they are struck because they are only struck
when each party sees a benefit in them being properly conducted. A
pragmatist acknowledges that disputes occur, but presumes that they
arise from external circumstances and each party should be prepared
to compromise to some extent to compensate for this change in the
external circumstances. The appropriate response to dishonest
breaches is to sever future trading relationships.
In the context of government actions the pressures and percep-
tions are quite different from a private contract. The individual lib-
erty of a private trader to bargain or not cannot be compared to the
liberty of sovereign states. Trade regulations by such states benefit
some citizens to the detriment of others. Even in capitalist societies,
mercantilist policies are a product of domestic political systems when
sectoral interests capture a disproportionate level of influence. Such
government actions are alarming if they interfere with the expected
actions of individual traders to enter into mutually beneficial bar-
gains. Mercantilism generally favors the rights of sectoral interests
over consumers. 40 Nevertheless, such economic philosophies cannot
be used to justify rules in an international system because they are
39 See generally Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, supra note 11.
40 The earliest phase of mercantilism, usually called bullionism, originated in
the period . . . during which Europe experienced an acute shortage of gold
and silver bullion and hence did not have enough money to service [its] rap-
idly expanding volume of trade. Bullionist policies were designed to attract a
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not accepted by all contracting parties. History is a better lesson. If
countries try to regulate to ensure a positive balance of trade, trade
diminishes. At the very least, there is a consensus among the con-
tracting parties that trade should occur.
IV. Legislation and Adjudication Methodologies
Perhaps the most neglected aspect of the debate about dispute
resolution in the past has been the consideration of minimum re-
quirements for a system aimed at effective legal decision making.
While this Perspective shows that many of the more extreme argu-
ments against a rule-based system can be undermined, it is just as
important to understand the limitations of law. This is necessary so
that safeguards can be built in when possible and too much reliance
is not placed on the prescriptive effect of the rules. Attention now
turns to identifying some of the methodological limitations. Some of
these arguments do not necessarily undermine the desirability of a
rule-based system, but merely qualify its real nature and the feasibil-
ity of its aims.
A reform exercise must be more than responsive to past
problems. The academic is one of the few that can afford to talk
about changes that are both desirable and impossible. GATT solu-
tions should have a substantial practical element. Nevertheless, the
intellectual process should not address practical limitations prema-
turely. The aim of the academic should be to draw up an abstract
agenda that contains all the theoretical issues that are important.
Next, theoretical impediments to such suggestions should be identi-
fied. Only then should the academic consider impediments in prac-
tice. The reformer should try, if possible, to determine the minimum
abstract requirements of an effective rule-based system and compare
those requirements with what is feasible and ultimately what is pro-
posed. If that minimum standard goes beyond what is proposed, we
must be prepared to provide reasoned criticism of the proposal and
arguments that encourage shifts in perceptions.
flow of gold and silver into a country and keep them there by prohibiting
their export.
After the bullionist period, the merchantilists' desire to maximize the gold
and silver within a country took the form of attempts by the government to
create a favorable balance of trade. To them a favorable balance of trade meant
that money payments into the country would be greater than money flowing
out of the country. Thus exports of goods as well as such things as shipping
and insuring when they were performed by compatriots and paid for by for-
eigners were encouraged, and imports of goods amd shipping and insurance
charges paid to foreigners were discouraged. A favorable balance of trade
would ensure augmentation of the country's treasury. Even though some
gold and silver would be paid out in the process, more would come in than
leave.
E. HUNT & H. SHERMAN, ECONOMICS-AN INTRODUCTION TO TRADITIONAL AND RADICAL
VIEws 21 (5th ed. 1986) (emphasis in original).
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The first issue is the approach to lawmaking within the GATT.
The domestic analogy to this issue is the role of statute law versus
common or judge-made law. Whether panels themselves can make
law is a preliminary question. The strict answer is no.4' What then
is the status of panel reports? In a normative sense, should the
panels be able to make definitive rulings that bind the contracting
parties both in the instant dispute and in future actions? Many argue
that judge-made or panel-made law is inappropriate in an interna-
tional forum such as the GATT. The GATT is based on consensus
and it would offend sovereignty if a panel interprets an agreement in
a way that goes beyond the initial consensus. These arguments,
however, misrepresent the nature of law and ignore the limitations
of language.
When contracting parties negotiate a rule which says that subsi-
dies can be countervailed if they cause injury, they delegate to the
adjudicator the task of articulating and comparing appropriate crite-
ria. It is better if the criteria can be included in a Code, but it is often
not possible to identify an exhaustive list in advance without the aid
of a concentrated examination of real situations. When this is possi-
ble, the adjudicator still must weigh and rank the factors and assess
the competing evidentiary arguments. Nevertheless, adjudicators in
a delicate organization like the GAfT cannot be too dynamic. There
is always a need for a happy medium, although such a position is
difficult to circumscribe in explicit legal terminology. In a practical
sense, it depends on the qualities of the adjudicators.
The role of the adjudicator is of legitimate concern to many con-
tracting parties. The conservative response is that we should write
better laws and not rely on the adjudicators to be more "active" in
their interpretation. This response is too simplistic. A diplomatic
forum such as the GATT is not likely to be the optimum environ-
ment for drafting complex and comprehensive trade laws. Any dis-
pute settlement system occasionally operates on drafting that is less
than optimal quality.
In addition to the "soft" law arguments dealt with above, there
is the practical problem of trying to utilize laws built on defective or
impractical economic principles. Commentators have suggested that
the GATT's agricultural rules that contain concepts such as "equita-
ble share of world trade" 42 and causation concepts, like the an-
41 The concept of a panel is not even mentioned in Article XXIII. Panel reports are
advisory in nature until acted upon by the GATT Council. GATT Council decisions, pur-
suant to Article XXIII:2, give legal force to the panel reports. Panel reports, rulings, and
recommendations "have been adopted by the GATT Council almost invariably without
amendment or extensive discussion." Petersmann, GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings
Against the EEC, supra note 37, at 470.
42 See supra note 15 (discussing the problems with the concept in drafting "soft" agri-
cultural laws).
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tidumping and countervailing provisions, are too difficult to
interpret. Some economists have suggested that the antidumping
laws are not justified. Others have suggested that many of the cen-
tral concepts are indeterminate. Too often a legal system and its key
players are blamed when controversial results are unavoidable be-
cause of initial design or drafting defects.
Because of the different perspectives and aspirations of the par-
ticipants, the GATT was never drafted to give effect to a single policy
aim. While it is loosely based on the principles of comparative ad-
vantage and free trade, it does not demand total unregulated trade.
The GATT, in initial design, recent amendments, and practices, has
sought to accommodate a number of competing aims. In addition to
free trade, these aims include the development aims of less devel-
oped countries, the political aspirations in free trade areas, foreign
exchange issues, and the desire of most governments for full em-
ployment. For reasons of political necessity, the GATT contains
safety valves and exclusions that remove certainty. As a result, in any
interpretation process there is no single purpose that can be identi-
fied and employed as a yardstick. Even if there was an identifiable
purpose, the adjudicator would still face difficult interpretation ques-
tions associated with that single identifiable purpose. For example,
an agreement with a stated purpose of "absolutely free trade" as the
only purpose would still be difficult to interpret. Because interpreta-
tion is both difficult and necessary it is desirable to consider the role
of interpretation in more detail.
In any sophisticated adjudicatory system, decision makers must
determine what interpretation techniques to follow. In a domestic
context, the choice is often stated as between narrow or literal ap-
proaches, and expansive or purposive approaches. The Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, 43 which was arrived at after extensive
deliberation on such issues, chose an amalgam that made the literal
approach predominant. While this Convention does not directly ap-
ply to the GATT, some commentators have pointed out that the
Convention's approach is now part of customary international law.
There are problems with such an approach. From a policy point
of view in the domestic sphere, the choice of a narrow approach has
been justified on the basis of libertarian ideology. For example,
common law jurisdictions have evolved rules to the effect that crimi-
nal and revenue laws should be read against the state and in favor of
the individual. But the GATT dispute settlement is not between the
state and an individual. It is between one contracting party and an-
other. As a result, there is not the same policy justification for a lit-
eral approach. Many of those same domestic systems also have
43 Opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969).
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experienced a shift to purposive interpretation. After all, the state is
not a visible entity separate from the citizens within it. To many
commentators the libertarian philosophy is too narrow a principle on
which to base a complete social compact.
The issue in the GATT is not a question of libertarianism, but a
question of sovereignty and the contractual limitations on the auton-
omy of a sovereign. The approach to interpretation is examined in
the general context of adjudicatory resolution of contract disputes.
Even here we must further examine what we mean by a contract.
The GATT contractual arrangement is not like a domestic contract,
at least in relation to dispute resolution. With the latter, the courts
readily look for implied terms to fill in any perceived gaps. Contract
law in most systems contains clearly defined interpretational maxims
and techniques that are known by the parties before the agreement.
These would not translate readily to a GATT context. The val-
ues that have determined the methodology of domestic contract dis-
pute resolution are very different from those that would be accepted
within an international organization. In the domestic sphere, the
rules value the certainty of some result over the importance of re-
stricting contractual obligations to voluntary manifest intentions.
Domestic rules look to the reasonable expectations of the promisee
when it is difficult to identify a clear meeting of the minds. Domestic
contract interpretation also concentrates solely on the intent at the
time of forming the contract. This is not as appropriate in an interna-
tional organization, although it is expected to be the proper starting
point. This in turn raises questions regarding the sensibility of the
teleological approach.
Although there have been a substantial number of disputes
within the GAT context without contracting parties or panels de-
bating these questions openly, these questions cannot be ignored in-
definitely. Agreements such as the GATT are necessary because
countries feel the desire to behave in ways that do not give effect to
mutual benefits. If contracting parties were content to behave mutu-
ally, there would be no need for trade agreements. Agreements re-
strain inappropriate mutual behavior. They do not affect the
underlying desires, but only impose barriers to the consummation of
those desires. In this environment it is becoming more evident that
contracting parties frequently consider the nature of their obliga-
tions and interpret them narrowly or avoid them through creative
artifice. Some of these devices are probably legal in the strict sense.
They are viewed by some as entirely proper, while others regard
them as similar to unchallengable and unmeritorious tax avoidance
techniques.
Some of these avoidance techniques are illegal. In most cases
the devices are unlikely to be consistent with the trade liberalization
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purposes behind the GATT. Examples include tariff specialization,
tariff escalation, upstream subsidies, voluntary export restraints and
other "grey area" measures, variable levies, and tariff quotas. Most
devices have the commercial effect of discriminating between export-
ers, or restricting imports, and are drafted to look like something
other than an illegal quantitative restriction or a discriminatory rule
in breach of Article I.
Voluntary export restraints rely on the absence of a traditional
complainant, while the variable levy and the tariff quota take on the
formalistic visage of tariffs or duties. Many argue that the variable
levy operates in the absence of meaningful bound tariffs and that
there is no avoidance purpose associated with it. They argue that it
is simply a case by case optimal tariff rather than a specified tariff
level of general application. In an economic sense, however, there is
a contrary argument that a true tariff leaves the domestic manufac-
turer subject to some real price competition. If the duty rate always
gives the manufacturer an advantage, it is an abuse of that term to
describe it as a tariff.
Tariff specialization and tariff escalation show that reciprocity
and MFN treatment cannot guarantee fundamental equality of treat-
ment when there is no desire for this to occur. Tariff specialization
occurs when the tariff categories are described so narrowly that an
effective preference is given to certain producers. Tariff escalation is
the phenomenon of tariff rates being low on primary producers, ris-
ing gradually because there is more labor intensive value added to
those products and falling again in relation to high technology
goods. This demonstrates how tariff reductions serve the mercantil-
ist interests of industrialized countries. These are examples of a
trend that is likely to continue.
As tariff barriers are removed through progressive Rounds, at-
tention has turned to nontariff barriers. Attention is likely to turn to
identifying loopholes in Codes negotiated to limit nontariff barriers.
A legal system that regulates commercial activity needs to consider
how to react to such avoidance techniques. It is desirable to dis-
suade participants from spending time on such endeavors because
the cost to the system cannot be overestimated. The most effective
means is to encourage anti-avoidance methodology by adjudicators.
The GATT legislative process is too slow and easily frustrated to
deal with each and every technique as it comes to light. Once such
techniques are widely practiced norms of behavior, it is too much to
ask of a dispute settlement system to restrict them through expansive
interpretation. An early adjudication could preclude the spread of
such techniques. That task is not easy.
While it is demonstrable that a commercial regulation system
needs to deal with avoidance, how is the term defined? How are ac-
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tions categorized into acceptable and unacceptable techniques?
These are formidable questions facing panelists. If avoidance tech-
niques are likely to be a problem, thought may be given to the draft-
ing or strengthening of anti-avoidance devices. Nondiscriminatory
principles are aimed at ensuring that reciprocal bargains are not sub-
sequently undermined by more favorable agreements with third par-
ties. The ability to complain about nullification and impairment in
the absence of breach is also an anti-avoidance mechanism because it
concerns itself with the substance of international practices. In addi-
tion, the role of the secretariat, surveillance and transparency mecha-
nisms, and the desirability of a code of interpretation or some other
explicit directives need to be considered.
While there are many complex variables in these recommenda-
tions, it is better to begin an assessment of the issues at this stage,
rather than wait until a critical mass of actual disputes supports the
predictions made. Such sensitive issues are unlikely to be resolved in
the context of actual disputes between major traders.
The final issue and the one that goes to the heart of the dispute
settlement question is the role of precedent within the GATT sys-
tem. The strict legal position is that contracting parties cannot be
bound by any panel report whether in the instant dispute or a previ-
ous one. This assumes that the correct position is the position evi-
denced by the terms of the GATT itself and unaffected by accepted
practices. It also begs the question faced by most final courts of ap-
peal. Invariably they also have the right to ignore past decisions.
Nevertheless, most courts choose to follow precedent except in unu-
sual circumstances.
Examination of the GATT panel reports shows that past ap-
proaches are often followed and they are cited. It is interesting that
in a pluralistic body such as the GATT, precedent in dispute settle-
ment is so highly prized. Many contracting parties do not afford any-
where near the role to precedent in their domestic judicial systems.
This is explicable because precedent acts as a constraint on judicial
activism and a stimulus to certainty. Comparative lawyers also show
that much of the stated difference is illusory. Civil law judges find
themselves able to follow past decisions with the same ease with
which common law judges can distinguish them.
In the GATT context, there are additional reasons why panels
often follow past decisions. Panels often would not wish to be
viewed as making new decisions that favor one contracting party over
another. Following "precedent" looks as if the panel had not made
any such choice. In reality, however, choosing to follow a nonbind-
ing precedent is as activist as the contrary approach. Panelists may
prefer to follow past decisions because their reasoning is more criti-
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cally evaluated when failing to follow a precedent than when follow-
ing it.
V. The Process of Dispute Resolution
The one area of GATT dispute settlement that has been dis-
cussed at some length is procedure, particularly in relation to the
constitution of panels and the adoption of reports. 44 In spite of the
amount of discussion over the adequacy of the present panel proce-
dures and structures there are a number of issues that have not been
considered. These should be addressed to determine the full extent
of desirable reforms. The debate so far has been limited to reacting
to the most serious of the present defects. Commentators have iden-
tified in great detail the major defects that have emerged recently.
At the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round held in Montreal in
December 1988, a text on dispute settlement was prepared with a
view towards being adopted. It was not formally adopted because of
the breakdown of negotiations on other issues, particularly agricul-
44 While Article XXIII implies an adjudicative dispute settlement process because it
enables the contracting parties to give a ruling when appropriate, and in certain circum-
stances to authorize retaliation, it did not establish a separate or independent adjudicatory
body. The present panel procedure was established by some degree by slight of hand. R.
HUDEC, supra note 2, at 80.
During the Tokyo Round, the Contracting Parties adopted an Understanding regard-
ing Notification, Consultation, Dispute, Settlement and Surveillance (hereinafter the "Un-
derstanding") with an Annex, being an Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of
the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement. See GATT, 26th Supp. B.I.S.D. 210 (1980).
The actual conduct and procedure depends in part on the terms of Article XXIII and
in part on customary practice as outlined in the Understanding. While Article XXIII re-
quires a preliminary consultation phase, the consultation procedure in Article XXII: 1 has
been accepted as satisfying this precondition. See GAIT, 9th Supp. B.I.S.D. 20 (1961). On
November 10, 1958, procedures were adopted in relation to Article XXII consultations.
See GATT, 7th Supp. B.I.S.D. 24 (1959). On April 5, 1966, procedures were adopted in
relation to Article XXIII. See GATT, 14th Supp. B.I.S.D. 139-40 (1966). In 1966, the
Contracting Parties determined that with disputes between industrialized and developing
countries the latter may ask the Director-General to use his good offices to seek a resolu-
tion of the dispute. See id. at 18.
Further attention was given to dispute settlement procedures in the 1982 Ministerial
Declaration. See 29th Supp. B.I.S.D. 13 (1983). The 1979 Understanding and the 1982
Ministerial Declaration both envisioned a voluntary conciliation phase being more gener-
ally applied. The 1982 Ministerial Declaration indicated that no major change was re-
quired in the framework of procedures for the settlement of disputes but rather there was
scope for more effective use of the existing mechanisms and supported the procedures in
the Understanding. Id. In July 1985, a note was prepared by the Office of Legal Affairs of
the Secretariat setting out the internal working procedures customarily adopted by panels
established under Article XXII:2. These procedures have been regularly adopted since
the publication of that note.
If the consultative processes do not effect a solution, the complainant may ask the
contracting parties to establish a Panel. Because the practice of GATT Council meetings
is that decisions must be unanimous, there can be considerable delay in agreeing to the
establishment of a Panel and agreeing on the actual persons who are to serve on it.
Notwithstanding that the procedure has now been used for many years, there is still no
express right to the appointment of a Panel although establishment has been delayed but
never denied.
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tural subsidies. All matters were left in abeyance until the forthcom-
ing April meeting of the contracting parties in Geneva. The
perceived defects and current proposals include the following.
(1) Selecting panelists. Delays occur because most parties must
agree on the members. The text allows the Director-General to se-
lect panelists if the parties cannot agree within twenty days.
(2) Limited pool of panelists. Disputants are reluctant to agree on
panelists that appear to be "related" to a party or who have insuffi-
cient experience. This puts a great strain on certain members such
as the Nordic group, whose representatives are invariably the first
approached.
(3) External panelists. The contracting parties have approved
and started to employ "outside" experts on panels to relieve the
strain on certain members. The text recommends that this be fur-
ther developed.
(4) The right to a panel. Debate has occurred over when and
whether a party can unilaterally demand that a panel be established
and what terms of reference are appropriate. The text makes this
right to a panel clear.
(5) Time periods. There is some tension resulting from the fact
that there is no clear time frame for establishing panels, for panel
deliberations and reports, and for ultimate adoption of reports. The
text proposes a nine month maximum for the panel process and pro-
vides recommended goals of six months and three months respec-
tively for ordinary and urgent matters.
(6) Drafting of terms of reference. In most domestic legal systems,
it is not up to the parties to determine the appropriate terms of refer-
ence and no one party has a veto over such matters. It is open to the
complainant to make allegations as broad as wished. The adjudica-
tor determines which allegations are reasonable. Recent disputes
have shown an unfortunate tendency to use the negotiation of draft
terms of reference both to delay the procedure and to limit the ambit
of the potential panel decision. The text proposes standard terms of
reference to be employed in each dispute unless the parties agree to
the contrary within twenty days.
(7) Follow up. Various parties disagree over the proper follow
up action when identified breaches are not immediately rectified.
The text asks the Council to follow up panel decisions.
(8) Veto powers. In recent disputes the contracting parties have
frustrated the system by abusing the effective veto that a consensual
approach gives to the losing party. The text did not contain any pro-
posal to alter the consensual approach to the adoption of reports.
These are real and fundamental problems that must be ad-
dressed if a dispute settlement system is to have any chance of pro-
viding any benefits to the international economic order. They have
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been known for some time and preoccupied the negotiating group
on dispute resolution in its early deliberations. This is as it should
be. 'Nevertheless, there are other issues that are vulnerable to im-
proper manipulation, or that could unnecessarily restrict the effec-
tiveness of a dispute settlement system. The existing defects bring
no credit to the contracting parties and are almost entirely without
intellectual justification. These defects can be remedied. The impor-
tant question is to identify other desirable reforms, if any.
Successful research begins with an examination of procedural
issues both in international fora and in domestic legal systems. This
is because such systems are typically more sophisticated and contain
a broader array of possible devices. It is appropriate to consider the
policy basis for each procedural device to determine if such policy
goal is desirable and feasible in an international context. It is neces-
sary to consider comparative attitudes to procedure and determine if
such devices are considered desirable by various contracting parties.
There are many more potential areas for dispute settlement that
must be addressed at some point by any sophisticated legal system.
In addition to the above issues, other procedural questions worthy of
consideration, or worthy of reconsideration if they were dealt with in
some way under the GATT Understandings or Agreements, include
the following.
(1) Locus standi. The rules regarding standing for GATT com-
plaints depend on the terminology of Article XXIII and on the con-
cepts of "nullification and impairment." Consideration should be
given to whether this is a sufficient and appropriate criterion. Possi-
bly an independent person such as the Director General should be
allowed to bring complaints before the relevant body.
(2) Representative actions. Allied to the question of standing is
the problem of outside interested parties. In a system such as the
GATT, the subject matter of a particular dispute is invariably of in-
terest to parties other than the two disputants. Although interested
parties are normally given rights to appear before panels, it is not
clear what the full extent of these rights are. In particular, if a com-
plaint is made by one contracting party about the export practices of
another member in relation to a particular commodity, should the
particular complainant be allowed to utilize the panel report or
should all other relevant exporters be able to demand satisfaction
without further procedure? If this is not possible because of the
present strict interpretation of the Agreement, what would be the
attitude of the contracting parties to some form of class action?
(3) Third party rights. A further related issue is the duty of a
contracting party "breached" against to bring a complaint when the
breach is of no concern, or is even perceived to benefit the breached
party. Third country dumping and subsidization highlight the
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problems with thinking of disputes in two party terms. Limited third
party rights were suggested in the text discussed at the mid-term re-
view in Montreal.
(4) Individual rights. Some leading commentators have ques-
tioned whether individuals should be given the right to present com-
plaints when their own state is unable or unwilling to do so
effectively.
(5) Aid to weaker parties. As in domestic legal systems, the vari-
ous parties are not of similar size, economic development, and expe-
rience in preparing and presenting legal arguments. The question is
to what extent assistance should be provided to counteract these im-
balances. The mid-term review text suggested that the Secretariat
should provide assistance, particularly to developing countries.
(6) Interlocutory procedures. While few desire to see GATT dis-
pute resolution take on the formalistic trappings of many Western
democratic legal systems, there are instances when a party is unable
to pursue adequately a legitimate claim because key evidence is
within the sole possession of the defendant party. What obligations
are there to provide information to the other party and to the panel,
and should the present practice be changed?
(7) The appropriate burden and onus of proof Another problem is
the attitude of past panels towards the proposition that the presence
of breach is prima facie evidence of nullification and impairment.
Many of the concerns about the dispute settlement system have re-
sulted from dissatisfaction with particular panel findings. At times
this dissatisfaction stems from a misunderstanding of the nature of
law and the legal process. Adjudication in the legal system works by
presumption and assumption. Legal reasoning relies on induction
and deduction, and rarely on incontrovertible proof. The adjudica-
tor rarely knows with certainty what the correct answer is, but identi-
fies the best answer in the given dispute within the confines of the
appropriate probability required by the accepted burden of proof.
An important issue related to the question of burden and onus
of proof is the determination of the appropriate minimum require-
ments before a panel can come to firm conclusions. A particular ex-
ample involves causation questions. Commentators have argued
that panels should not require a connection tending towards mathe-
matical certainty before finding certain causal criteria satisfied. This
approach is unacceptable in most legal systems.
(8) The role of expert witnesses. This category includes the appro-
priate role of panelists who are experts in a particular area and what
quasi-judicial notice they should take. In addition, this category in-
cludes the role of expert secretariat members who assist in the con-
duct of panel procedures, and the approach to testing the evidence
of particular experts called by the relevant parties.
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(9) Evidence rules. Consideration should be given to "best evi-
dence" stipulations if this is thought to be an appropriate means to
ensure that a decision is reached.
(10) Confidentiality. Questions regarding how open panel pro-
ceedings should be have troubled domestic courts, particularly in an-
tidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. In addition, courts
have also considered the extent to which evidentiary materials
should be restricted either with regard to third parties or the
complainant.
(11) The relevance of principles of natural justice or equity to panel pro-
cedures. The issues to consider include deciding what attitude should
be taken towards allegations of bias and affording full rights to be
heard. Consideration should also be given to whether there is any-
thing to learn from principles of equity such as the old maxim which
requires that one who comes to equity must come with "clean
hands."
(12) Abuse of process. This relates to unduly delaying proceed-
ings or even inundating a fellow contracting party with complaints to
force particular responses.
(13) Dealing with more than one dispute at a time. There are in-
stances when a number of disputes are interrelated in practical terms
and it is desirable to assess the whole relationship globally. The mid-
term review text proposed that panels be empowered to hear more
than one dispute on the same matter.
(14) Costs. Again, although it is undesirable to follow a strict
adversarial legal model, many contracting parties find it extremely
difficult to present comprehensive cases because of the cost factor.
(15) Remedies. Although it is unlikely that parties would agree
to major changes in the remedies area, this is an area for further
research. At the very least, a greater understanding of the nature
and scope of the existing remedies would lead to a better under-
standing of the present dispute settlement process. While an un-
likely reform, interim measures are useful in protecting claimants in
certain disputes.
(16) Settlements. Considerations with respect to settlements in-
clude the appropriate attitude of other contracting parties when dis-
putants seek to settle a matter either before or after a panel has made
its report. An additional question is whether settlement must be
consistent with GATT norms and, if so, who has the right to evaluate
the terms of the settlement to ensure that this is the case. Whether
there is an obligation on the disputants to notify other contracting
parties of the terms of the settlement is also unclear. The mid-term
review text suggested that notification of the Council of settlement
be required and that the settlements be within the GATT rules.
(17) Adoption of panel reports by a methodology less than full consensus.
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As indicated above, full consensus grants to each party, including the
disputants, an effective right of veto of any panel report. Other
methodologies have been discussed and these are being considered
as part of the current negotiations.
(18) Review of decisions. In the domestic sphere many states use
a three-tier adjudicatory system because it is considered more accu-
rate. Questions regarding whether the Council or some higher body
can conduct a formal appeal and whether cases can be remitted for
further consideration must be addressed.
(19) Review of compliance. This is a question of follow-up by the
panel or Council or is a subset of the more general surveillance issue
in the GATT context.
VI. Evaluating the Effectiveness of Dispute Resolution
Identifying and analyzing these questions is not the end of the
matter. This Perspective has sought to identify the general intellec-
tual issues that should be addressed in any meaningful review of the
GATT dispute settlement system. They should not be discussed in a
vacuum. Rather, the first stage should be a critical evaluation of the
strengths and weaknesses of the treatment of past disputes under the
GATT. This is currently being done as part of the Uruguay Round
negotiations. The potential defects in any empirical methodology
and the effect this may have on the correctness of the conclusions
should not be underestimated.
This again raises fundamental questions of what is meant by dis-
pute settlement, when has it been used, and how effective has it
been? These questions are difficult to answer when limited to com-
pleted panel reports as the sample for critical evaluation. While
there are good practical reasons for limiting research and evaluation
to such visible forms of data, there are serious and unanswerable
questions regarding the real effect of a dispute settlement system.
These include: Who was deterred from breaching the rules and why;
how many disputes were dropped or resolved .before the Article XX-
III stage and why; and whether the Article XXIII approach has been
consistently followed throughout the history of the GATT. There
are many procedures under other Articles and there are a number of
other matters dealt with by Working Parties that come within most
standard definitions of a "dispute."
In addition, there are a number of ways to categorize the known
disputes or potential disputes. Disputes are categorized according to
the measure used, the type of parties involved, the product or sector,
the drafting difficulty, the remedy sought, the'economic concept in-
volved, or by the creativity of the ruling. These categories can be
used for empirical analysis of past disputes and analytical considera-
tion of the effectiveness of dispute settlement in various areas. An-
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other method of categorization involves identifying how panels have
behaved on questions of precedent, fact finding, witnesses, and more
general issues such as the choice between equity and efficiency.
In addition to the need to be prepared to justify the categoriza-
tions chosen, the temptation to compile and rely on percentage sta-
tistics from which to postulate conclusions should be avoided. There
are scientific limitations to such an exercise due to the limited data
pool and the many value judgments in the choice of categories for
such statistical analysis. As a result, the worth of any hypothesis is
easily undermined by such methodological issues. For example, if
the dispute settlement process was perceived to have "succeeded" in
thirty-seven out of forty cases, does this mean it was successful over-
all? What if two out of the three "problem" cases were the only
cases brought by a particular contracting party? What if they consti-
tuted the majority of cases in a difficult product sector? What if the
three problem cases were the last three panel decisions? What if
there were fifty similar disputes that were resolved outside of the
GATT and in ways inconsistent with its provisions?
The veracity of dispute settlement statistics under the GATT is
questionable even when the researcher has the best intentions. The
categories are by no means mutually exclusive. For these reasons
the myriad of factors present make the question of what caused fail-
ure beyond the capabilities of purely empirical testing in the GATT
setting.
VII. Conclusion
The above jurisprudential, procedural, and methodological is-
sues are far too complex to encourage even tentative conclusions at
this stage about the desired makeup of the GATT dispute settlement
process. They do suggest, however, that there are enough important
issues emanating from this increasingly complex agreement that
need to be addressed instead of the more extreme arguments. In the
above discussion I have sought to identify those issues I believe to be
important in a meaningful debate about the GATT dispute resolu-
tion system. While my preliminary responses to many of the key ar-
guments show a bias in favor of a rule-based system, I have sought to
highlight the more significant factors that both support and restrict
the potential effect of a dispute settlement mechanism. The simpliS-
tic polarized arguments of the past should be recognized as such and
discarded, and attention should be shifted to the more difficult
questions.
In view of the highlighted defects in the traditional pragmatist
argument, it should be clear that there is some meaningful role for
law and dispute resolution to play in the GATT multilateral trading
system. The exact role of law that is likely and proper is more diffi-
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cult to define, but this should not concern us unduly. Law is one of a
number of stimuli. The fact that it does not guarantee anything im-
plies that its potential for compliance is easily underestimated. It is a
waste of effort to determine precisely how important law is compared
to other factors because the mix changes over time. As long as the
role of law is more than minimal, the effort to create an effective
rule-based system should be made. That effort includes considera-
tion of general questions such as deciding how extensive the dispute
settlement system should be, by whom and under what methodology
should it be conducted, how the contracting parties should review
and override the mechanism, and how to select and negotiate appro-
priate models for change.
This debate should be conducted with the knowledge that inter-
national economic law is neither a panacea nor a snake oil cure. The
realities of the negotiating table demand that some of these issues be
left alone. Progress is not facilitated by rushing headlong into a far-
reaching debate. Nevertheless, the abstract intellectual agenda re-
mains the same-ignoring it only ensures future problems and com-
plex negotiations.
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Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Australia
Austriat
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Belize
Begin
Botswana
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Burma
Burundi
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Congo
C6te d'Ivoire
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Egypt
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia, The
Appendix A
A. Contracting Parties to the GATT'
Germany, Federal Republic of Niger
Ghana Nigeria
Greece Norway
Guvana Pakistan
Haiti Peru
Hong Kong Philippines
Hungary Poland
Icleand Portugal
India Romania
Indonesia Rwanda
Ireland Senegal
Israel Sierra Leone
Italy Singapore
Jamaica South Africa
Japan Spain
Kenya Sri Lanka
Korea Suriname
Kuwait Sweden
Lesotho Switzerland
Luxembourg Tanzania
Madagascar Thailand
Malawi Togo
Malaysia Trinidad and Tobago
Maldives Turkey
Malta Uganda
Mauritania United Kingdom
Mauritius United States
Mexico Uruguay
Morocco Yugoslavia
Netherlands Zaire
New Zealand Zambia
Nicaragua Zimbabwe
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Algeria
Angola
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Brunei
Cape Verde
Dominica
Equatoiial Guinea
Fiji
Grenada
B. Acceded Provisionally
Tunisia
C. De Facto Application 
2
Guinea-Bissau
Kampuchea, Demoratic
Kiribati
Mali
Mozambique
Papua New Guinea
Qatar
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Sao Tome and Principe
Seychelles
Solomon Islands
Swaziland
Tonga
Tuvalu
United Arab Emirates
Yemen, People's Democratic
Republic of
Source: M. KELLY, N. KIRMANI, M. XAFA, C. BOONE KAMP & P. WINGLER, ISSUES AND
DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD TRADE POLICY 134, table A27 (1988).
' As of June 30, 1988
2 Countries to whose territories the GATT has been applied and which now, as
independent states, maintain a de facto application of the GATF pending final decisions as
to their future commercial policy.
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